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Abstract

In this paper, we develop a new model in marketable pollution permits that consists of
perfectly competitive, multi-product, multi-pollutant firms. The formulation and qualitative
analysis of the model, as well as the computational approach, are based on the theory of
variational inequalities.
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1. Introduction
The problem of environmental pollution results partly from the absence of prices
of certain scarce environmental goods, such as clean air and water. Because there
is no cost attached to the discharge of pollutants, and there is no incentive for the
reduction of discharges, industrial firms emit an excessive amount of pollution that,
in many cases, is more than can be absorbed by the environment.
One economic approach to the pollution-reduction problem is to set up a market
for pollution permits. In this approach, at least in theory, the pollution-emitters
have a choice between reducing emissions by employing some abatement tech-

nology, or purchasing permits from other emitters that hold excess permits. The
permits in such a market would be completely transferrable, so that the participat
ing emitters could trade the permits, depending on their cost of control. As
Tietenberg (1980) notes, this reallocation of permits can lead to substantial
reductions in pollution, under competitive conditions, while ensuring that environ
mental quality standards are met.
An alternative approach to the pollution-reduction problem is to place an
appropriate price on the polluting firms. It turns out that the corrective price takes
the form of a Pigouvian tax (Pigou, 1920), which, if set equal to the marginal
external cost, will induce the polluting firm to internalize the full social costs of its
contribution to the pollution damage (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Yet another
approach, i.e. that of unit subsidies, is equivalent to the tax approach, in that it can
establish the same incentive for abatement as would a tax of an identical magni
tude. However, these two approaches have different implications for the profitabil
ity of production in the polluting industry and the long-run entry-exit decisions
(Cropper and Oates, 1992).
In this paper, we develop a general market model in pollution permits, in which
individual firms will minimize costs, while ensuring that the externally set environ
mental quality standards are met. The individual firms produce multiple products
and emit multiple pollutants. We assume that the firms are perfectly competitive in
their output markets, as well as in the permit markets. Because we are analyzing
firm behavior at large, each source of pollution takes the price of its output and the
pollutant-specific permit as given, because it is assumed that each source in a
region is small relative to the entire economy. The model deals explicitly with
spatial differentiation, through the use of a diffusion matrix that maps emissions
from sources to receptor points that are dispersed in space. This is especially
important because studies show that, for certain pollutants, if spatial differentia
tion is not built into the system, then the cost-savings from employing an
economic-incentive-based approach will be lost (Mendelsohn, 1986).
The marketable pollution permit approach is selected for analysis in this paper,
for a variety of reasons. The primary reason is that the regulatory body then has
direct control over the quantity of emissions in the region, because it has the
authority to issue pollution permits equal to the efficient quantity of pollution. The
permit approach also enjoys the advantage of familiarity, because it is a modified
form of the current regulatory approach. The strongest motive for marketable
pollution permits, however, is that it provides an incentive for polluters to adopt
new abatement and control technologies to reduce the level of emissions, because
the excess number can be sold in the form of marketable assets.
The methodology that we utilize for the formulation, qualitative analysis and
computation of the equilibrium pattern in markets for pollution control is the
theory of variational inequalities. The theory of variational inequalities has already
been utilized to study a plethora of equilibrium problems in economics and
operations research (Nagurney, 1993). In particular, it has been used recently to
study equilibrium problems with policy interventions in the setting of spatial
economic markets (Nagurney and Zhao, 1991; Nagurney et al., 1995, 1996) and in
financial markets (Dong, 1995; Nagurney and Dong, 1995). The framework devel-

oped in this paper yields the profit-maximized quantities of the multiple products;
the equilibrium quantities of the various emissions; the equilibrium allocation of
pollution licenses; and the prices of the licenses. The use of variational inequality
theory in environmental economics has yet to be fully explored. Here, we aim to
make a contribution in this direction.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider the behavior of the
individual firm and develop the optimization problem faced by the firm. Subse
quently, we present the economic conditions that govern the market model and
then derive the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium conditions.
We also establish that the equilibrium pattern does satisfy environmental quality
standards imposed by the government, provided that the sum of licenses for each
pollutant for a receptor point is equal to the imposed standard for that point.
Furthermore, the equilibrium allocation of licenses is independent of the initial
allocation of licenses, provided that the sums are satisfied. These are important
features from an operational standpoint. In addition, we provide some qualitative
properties of the equilibrium pattern.
In Section 3, an algorithm is proposed for the computation of equilibrium,
accompanied by the conditions for convergence. The algorithm - a modified
projection method - is then applied to compute solutions to several numerical
examples in Section 4. Finally, we summarize our results and present the conclu
sions in Section 5.
2. The model

In this section, we develop a multi-product, multi-pollutant market model in
pollution permits that yields the profit-maximizing quantities of firms' products, the
efficient quantities of emissions, and the equilibrium allocation of pollution licen
ses, in addition to the prices of the licenses.
We consider m sources of industrial pollution, which are firms that are fixed in
location, with a typical source denoted by i. There are n receptor points, with a
typical receptor point denoted by j. We assume that, in general, the firms and the
receptor point are spatially separated. Let there be r different pollutants emitted
by the sources, with a typical pollutant denoted by t. Each source produces a vector
of emissions denoted by e;, where e; = (eJ, ... , ef, ..., e;) and where the compo
nent e! denotes the amount of pollutant t emitted by source i. We further group
the vectors {e 1, ••• , em } into the vector e ER":.�
We assume, as given, an m x n X r diffusion matrix H, where the component
h\j denotes the contribution that one unit of emission by source i makes to the
average pollutant concentration of type t at receptor point j. This idea comes from
Montgomery (1972), who stated that the emission vector e; can be mapped into
concentrations by the diffusion matrix H so that the resultant emissions will not
exceed the externally set standard.
Let a permit denote a license, the possession of which will allow a source to emit
a specific pollutant at some specific receptor point. Hence, each polluter will have
to hold a portfolio of licenses to cover all the relevant monitored receptor points.

Let Ifi denote the number of licenses for pollutant t at point j held by source i,
and let us group licenses for each firm i into a vector I;E R!� We then further
group the vectors {/ 1 , • • • , Im } into the vector IE R";. n '. We assume throughout that
.
.
.
10
some m1·1·ial alloca1·10n of 1·1censes, 1.e. 1ij;
i• = 1 , ... , m; J = 1 , ... , n; t = 1 , .. ., r,
has been made by the regulatory government authority.
Furthermore, let p] denote the price of the license for pollutant t that affects
receptor point j, and let us group the prices into the vector p E R'!7". Also, assume
that the market in pollution licenses is perfectly competitive, i.e. each source of
pollution takes the price of the license to pollute at a specific point as given and
cannot affect the price itself, because each source is small relative to the entire
economy.
We also assume that the sources are perfectly competitive in their input and
output markets. Let there be o different outputs produced by the sources, with a
typical output denoted by k. Each of the sources produces a vector of products
denoted by q;, where qi = (q;1, ..., qik • ..., q;) and where qik is the quantity of
product k produced by source i. We group the vectors {q i , ... , qm } into the vector
q E R";. 0• Also, let 1Tk denote the price of the product which is assumed to be taken
by a typical firm.
We further assume that the firms exhibit profit-maximizing behavior. To de
scribe mathematically the behavior of the firms in the market, we first discuss the
cost function faced by a typical firm and, subsequently, we define a market
equilibrium relative to an initial allocation of licenses. Next, we derive the variatio
nal inequality formulation of the governing equilibrium conditions, the solution to
which yields the efficient quantities of product, emissions and licenses along with
the license prices.
2.1. The cost function
To maximize profit, a competitive firm needs to minimize the cost of producing
its optimal level of output. The cost function measures the minimum cost of
producing some level of output, given fixed factor prices. Following the treatment
by Henderson and Quandt (1980), we derive the cost function from the information
on the production functions, the cost expression and the expansion path function.
A production function is an equation or a schedule that shows the maximum
amount of output that can be produced from any specified set of inputs, given the
existing technology. In our case, the production function for the product qik
depends on the employment of firm i's resources to the production of qi vector.
Assume that a firm employs v types of input, with a typical input denoted bys. Let
xi, denote the input that firm i employs in its production activity and let
denote the transformation function of inputs into outputs. Hence, it follows that

'IJI/

k = 1, ... , 0.

(1)

For each pollutant t, the emissions function, in tum, depends on the employ
ment of firm i's resources to the abatement activity for the vector ei and on the

vector qi . We include the vector qi because the emissions of a firm are directly
related to the production activity. Let T/ denote the transformation function of the
inputs and the output into the emissions. Therefore, we may write
t = 1, ..., r.

(2)

Let the total cost of production G; be given by

E W;sx , + b
V

G; =

s= l

i

(3)

where W;5 denotes the price of input X;.,, and b denotes the cost of any fixed inputs.
If the production function is strictly quasi-concave, then every point of tangency
between an isoquant and an isocost line is the solution of both a constrained-maxi
mum problem and a constrained-minimum problem. The locus of all the tangency
points gives us the expansion path for the firm. A rational, profit-maximizing firm
will select only input combinations that lie on its expansion path.
Formally, this path is an implicit function of the inputs that can be expressed as

(4)
Assume that the systems of equations given by Eqs. (1)-(4) can be reduced to a
single equation in which cost is stated as an explicit function of the level of output
of products and emissions, and the input prices plus the fixed cost of inputs, i.e.
G; =

L <l>;(e;, q;, W;5) + b.
V

s=

I

(5)

This cost function cl>; is non-decreasing, homogeneous of degree one, and
concave with respect to the input prices w;.,· We can assume that the input prices
are invariant, so that the cost function depends on the emissions and output level,
plus the fixed cost of inputs. Furthermore, this fixed cost of fixed inputs b must be
paid by the firm i, regardless of whether or not it engages in production. Hence,
the cost function takes the general form
(6)

2. 2. A firm's optimization problem
We now construct a constrained optimization problem in which a typical firm has
to take into account the joint cost of production and emissions abatement, as well
as the cost of purchasing pollution licenses.
Because the price of the product qik is 1rk, each firm i acquires a revenue of

(7)

as

In addition, the value of a firm's initial endowment of licenses can be expressed
r

n

E E PJ*1:y

j= 1 t= 1

where pf* denotes the given price of a license to pollute a specific pollutant t at
receptor point j, which, under the assumption of perfect competition in the license
markets, is assumed as given.
Also, the net cost of purchasing licenses for a specific pollutant t at all the
receptor points is given by
n

t
-11I]0 ) "
�
i.J pJ *(/1.
I)

j= 1

Consequently, the total net cost of purchasing licenses to cover all the emitted
pollutants is given by
r

n

l
�
11I]0 ) "
i.J �
i.J pJ * (11.
I) -

(8)

t= I j= I

We assume that each firm in the market is profit maximizing, so that it can be
characterized by a utility function that measures its profit or net revenue. Hence,
the utility function U; that faces each such firm i; i = 1, ..., m, can be expressed as
the difference between the total revenue acquired by a firm and the total cost
incurred by the firm. We have
U;

= u;(q;, e;, l;) =

o

L

k=I

rrkqik -

G;(e;, q; ) -

L L pj*(l!j - 1:n.
n

r

j=lt=I

(9)

A firm's optimization problem can be then expressed as
(10)

subject to
j = 1, ... ,n, t = l, ... ,r

(11)

and the non-negativity constraints
k = 1, ..., o, t = 1, ..., r.

(12)

Eq. (11) states that each firm is allowed to have an average rate of emission for
pollutant t that produces no more pollution at any point than the amount which
the firm is licensed to cause at that point.
We let A:i denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the jtth constraint of
Eq. (11), and we group these multipliers into the vector A; E R:� We note that Aji

may be interpreted as the marginal cost of pollution abatement for pollutant t
associated with firm i and receptor point j; we now term this Lagrange multiplier
as the marginal abatement cost.
The utility function for each perfectly competitive firm is concave with respect to
licenses. Assuming that the utility function u;(q;, e;, l) is continuously differen
tiable and concave with respect to e; and q;, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for an optimal product-specific output and pollutant-specific emissions, license and
marginal abatement cost pattern (q'(, e'(, l;, A�) is that this pattern is non-negative
and satisfies the inequality

l _

;. aG;(e;, q;) _
[
1rk (qik
aqik
k= 1
i..,

X (ef - ef*) +

�

i..,
1= 1

L L (pJ* - A:j) (lf

j= It= 1
n

r

i

[

aG/ e '(, q'()
n
L
A:jh: i
+
1
ae;
j= 1
l

- lfj)

E E (lfj - h:ief*) ( A:i - A:j) � 0

j= I
n

+

q*
ik) +

r

Vq;k � 0, ef � 0, Lt � 0, ,\:i � O; j = 1, ..., n, k = 1, ..., o, t = 1, ..., r.
I=

I

Note that, in equilibrium, a similar inequality needs to hold for each of the other
perfectly competitive firms.
We now give a further interpretation to Eq. (13) in terms of equilibrium
conditions. Our goal here is to provide an economic interpretation to the optimal
ity condition of Eq. (13). In particular, the first term in Eq. (13) describes the
following equilibrium condition. For each product k, k = 1, ..., o, we have
0 of qik > 0
=
(14)
( � o: if qik = 0.
(13)

This condition states that, when a positive quantity of output is produced by a firm,
the principle of price equals marginal cost holds. However, if the marginal cost of
production is greater than the price charged for the output, then it does not benefit
the firm to produce and, consequently, qik = 0.
The second term in Eq. (13) describes the following equilibrium condition. For
each pollutant t, t = 1, ..., r, we have
if ef* > 0
if ef* = 0.

(15)

Recall that A:i is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the corresponding emis
sions constraint, and can be viewed as the marginal abatement cost to be borne by
firm i. The term A: ih: i is the shadow price times the ambient concentration for
pollutant t at receptor point j, and can be interpreted as the shadow

value to firm i of emissions constraint on ambient concentrations of pollutant t at
receptor point j. Also aG;(e;, q; )/ ae: is the marginal cost of reducing emissions
borne by firm i. Hence, the typical firm will only emit if this marginal cost equals
minus the marginal abatement cost. However, if the marginal cost of reducing
emissions is greater than minus the marginal abatement cost by the firm to reduce
emissions, then it will be infeasible for the firm to emit any pollutants, hence, e!*
will be zero.
Likewise, the third term in Eq. (13) describes the following equilibrium condi
tion. For each receptor point j, j = 1, ..., n, and for each pollutant t, t = 1, ..., r,
we have
= 0,

ifl1I)*>0

(pf* - A\j) f\ � 0, if 1:; = 0.

(16)

In other words, the final distribution of licenses will be positive only when the
marginal abatement cost of pollution borne ( Alj) by source i for pollutant t that
affects receptor point j is equal to the price of the specific pollutant license
associated with the receptor point j, i.e.pf*. However, when the actual price of the
license is greater than the marginal abatement cost, the final distribution of that
license is zero.
Finally, the fourth term in Eq. (13) describes the following equilibrium condition.
For each receptor point j, j = 1, ..., n, and for each pollutant t, t = 1, ... , r, we
have
(htI).etI * _ III)*)

f = O,
\ �

0,

if ,\1I)* >0

if A\j = 0.

(17)

This system has the following interpretation. When the em1ss1ons constraint is
binding, the shadow price A\j associated with the constraint reflects this fact, by
taking on a positive value. However, when the constraint is non-binding, the
shadow price associated with the constraint is driven to zero.
We now describe the system of equalities and inequalities that govern the
quantities and prices of the licenses in the region at equilibrium. Mathematically,
the economic system conditions that govern market clearance in pollution permits
are as follows. For each receptor point j, j = 1, ..., n, and for each pollutant t,
t = 1, ..., r, we have
m

10

� (1I) i...,

i= I

11*)
I)

if pJ* >0

if pJ* = 0.

(18)

This system states that, if the price of a license for pollutant t at a point j is
positive, then the market for licenses at that point must clear; if there is an excess
supply of licenses for a particular pollutant t at a receptor point, then the price of
a license at that point must be zero.

We now define an equilibrium by combining the optimality conditions for each
firm and the market clearing conditions for the pollution permits.

Definition (an equilibrium). A vector ( q*,e*, I*, A*,p*) E R";_ 0 +mr+2m11r+11r is an
equilibrium point of the market model for pollution permits developed above if and only
if it satisfies Eq. (13) for all firms i, and the system of equalities and inequalities of Eq.
(18) for all receptor points j = 1,...,n, and for all pollutants t = 1,..., r.

2.3. Variational inequality formulation

We now derive the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium condi
tions of Eq. (13) and (18) that govern the above multi-product, multi-pollutant
market model. The variational inequality problem is a unified framework within
which all the above inequalities and equalities can be expressed as a single
inequality. As mentioned in the Introduction, this framework has already been
used to formulate a plethora of equilibrium problems that arise in economics and
operations research (Nagurney, 1993). However, its potential in environmental
economics has yet to be fully explored.

Theorem 1 (variational inequality formulation). A vector of firm production outputs,
emissions, licenses and associated marginal abatement costs, along with the vector of
permit prices, i.e.
is an equilibrium point if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem, i.e.
( q*,e*, /*,A*,p*) E

E E[
i=l k=l
m

a

+

+

aG.(e* q*)
l (qik - qt)
'a'
qik' ' - 1rk

E E[
i=l /=]
m

+

r

aG.(e*
q*)
l
l
I
+
1
ae;
'

A;f*
i h ;i
E
j=l
n

t

E E E ( pJ* - A\j) (it - 1:j)
m

n

r

l

(e;t - e;l* )

E E E (l:j - h \ie/* ) ( A\i - A'.j)

i= 1 j= It= 1
m

+

Rmo+mr+2m11r+11r

n

r

E E E (l:Y -1;j)(PJ - pJ*) � o,
j= 1 t= 1 i= I
i= 1 j= 1 t= 1

n

r

m

't/(q, e,l , A , p ) E

R";.o+mr+2m11r+11r

(19)

Proof. See Appendix A.

We now put the variational inequality of Eq. (19) into standard form (Nagurney,
1993). Define the column vector (X) = (q, e, I, A,p) E R";. 0 + mr + 2m,,,+ "' and F(X)

as the row vector that consists of the row vectors (G(X), E(X), L(X), A(X), P(X)),
where G(X) is the mo-dimensional vector with component ik given by aGJ aq;k 1rk; E(X) is the mr-dimensional vector with component it given by
aG;

--,
ile; +

;, , h'
i.., A;j ij
j=I

L(X) is the mnr-dimensional vector with component ijt given by pJ - ,\'.j ; A(X) is
the mnr-dimensional vector with component ijt given by z:j - h'.j e:, and P(X) is
the nr-dimensional vector with jtth component by
m

E

i= I

(l:y - z: ).
j

The variational inequality of Eq. (19) can now be expressed as follows. De
termine X* E K, such that
VXEK
F(X*) (X-X*) � 0,
(20)
where K {(X) (q, e, I,,\, p) E R'::.o+mr+ 2mnr+nr}.
We now establish in the following corollary that the equilibrium patte� is
independent of the initial license allocation, provided that the sum of the licenses
for each receptor point for each pollutant is fixed. We then discuss what the value
of that sum should be, given the environmental quality standards.

=

=

z:y �

0 for all i = 1, ... , m, j = 1, ..., n and t = 1, ..., r and E;"= 1
Corollary 1. If
z:J = QJ for j = 1, ..., n and t = 1, ..., r, with each QJ fixed and positive, then the
equilibrium pattern (q*, e*,I*,,\*, p*) is independent of {l:J}.

Proof. The first four terms in the variational inequality of Eq. (19) are independent
for j = 1, ..., n
of {l:y}, whereas the last term only depends on the sum E;"= 1
and t = 1, ..., r.
D

z:y

Hence, any initial allocation of licenses that maintains the desired sum of the
licenses for each receptor point and pollutant will not affect the equilibrium
pattern.
We now present a theorem which provides a manner of determining the
appropriate sums of the initial licenses for each receptor point and pollutant. It is
an important result for operationalizing this approach.

Theorem 2. An equilibrium vector achieves environmental quality standards as repre
sented by the vector (Q 1, ••• , Qn ), where Qj = (QJ, ... , Q;), provided that E;"= 1
lfJ = QJ for j = 1, ... ,n and t = 1,..., r.
Proof. From Eq. (11), we have that, for each firm i, i = 1, ... , m, and for each
pollutant t, t = 1, ..., r, that

'*

h iii ei < [*ij•

Vj = l,...,n, Vt= l,...,r

Moreover, it follows from the equilibrium conditions of Eq. (18) and from the
assumption on the initial license allocations that
m

m

m

i=1

i=l

i= I

� t I
�
� [10
1... h ije; * :s;; i... 11ij* :s;; i... ij

_
-

t
Qj•

Vj=l, ...,n, Vt=l, ...,r

D

2.4. Qualitative properties
Here, we investigate certain qualitative properties of the equilibrium. In particu
lar, we establish properties of the function F(X) that are needed for convergence
of the algorithm in Section 3.
Lemma 1. If the utility function of Eq. (9) is concave for each firm i, then F(X) is
monotonic.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2. The function F(X) is Lipschitz continuous, i.e. there exists a positive
constant L, such that
vx1,x2 EK

(21)

under the assumption that the utility functions have bounded second-order derivatives.
Proof. This follows from the same arguments as the proof of Lemma 3 in Nagurney
(1993).

3. The algorithm

Here, we present an algorithm for the solution of the variational inequality of
Eq. (20) - equivalently, Eq. (19) - that governs the multi-product, multi-pollu
tant market equilibrium model for pollution permits. The algorithm resolves the
variational inequality problem into very simple subproblems, each of which can be
solved explicitly and in closed form.
The algorithm that we propose for the computation of the equilibrium pattern is
the modified projection method of Korpelevich (1976). The algorithm is guaranteed
to converge, provided that F satisfies only the monotonicity condition and the
Lipschitz continuity condition, assuming that a solution exists.
The statement of the modified projection method is as follows.
Step 1: Initialization. Set x 0 EK. Let /3 =l and let a be a scalar such that
0 < a< 1/L, where L is the Lipschitz continuity constant (cf. Eq. (21)).

Step 2: Computation. Compute X f3 by solving the variational inequality subproblem

[x/3 + aF(xf3-l)

T

-x13-1r (X-if3) � 0,

for all XE K

(22)

Step 3: Adaptation. Compute X f3 by solving the variational inequality subproblem
[x/3 + aF(X 13)

T

-x/3-lr (X-X13 ) � 0,

for all XE K

(23)

Step 4: Convergence verification. If maxi Xf - xf- 1 :s; E for all l, with E > 0 (a
prespecified tolerance), then stop; else, set /3 = /3 + 1, and go to Step 2.
We now discuss the modified projection method more fully. We first recall the
definition of the projection of x on the closed convex set K with respect to the
Euclidean norm, we denote this by PK x as
1

(24)
In particular, we note that (cf. Theorem 1.2, Nagumey, 1993) X f3 generated by
the modified projection method as the solution to the variational inequality
subproblem of Eq. (22) is actually the projection of X /3- 1 - aF(X/3- 1 )T on the
closed convex set K, where K here is simply the non-negative orthant. In other
words, we have
(25)

Similarly, X 13 generated by the solution to the variational inequality subproblem
of Eq. (23) is the projection of x/3- I - aF(if3)T on the non-negative orthant, i.e.
(26)

Because the feasible set here is of the box type, the above projections immedi
ately decompose across the coordinates of the feasible set. In fact, the solution of
each variable encountered in Eqs. (22) and (23) amounts to projecting on to R +
separately.
Consequently, we can provide closed-form expressions for the solution of the
problems of Eqs. (22) and (23). In particular, we have that Eq. (22) can be solved as
follows. For all firms i, i = 1, ..., m, products k, k = 1, ... o, and pollutants t,
t = 1, ..., r set

(27)
and
[aG;(ef- 1 ,qf- 1)
_
e'1f3 = max ( O , a
aef

� 1i.113-1h] + e t /3-,)
i.., I)
I
I)

j=I

(28)

For all firms i, i = l, ..., m, all receptor points j, j = 1, ..., n, and all pollutants t,

t = l, ..., r, set

i 1f3 = max{o
IJ

>

a (-p}'/3-l

+

1
a (-1I}/3-l

+ h.I) eIt f3-l) +

>._1/3-l)
I)

+

1 1 /3-l}
I]

(29)

and
>..'1)13 =

max{o

>

>._1/3-1}
I}

(30)

Finally, for all receptor points j, j = 1, ..., n, and all pollutants t, t = l, ..., r,
set

p]f3=max(o, a (-_i::1:y+ _i::1:1t=I

1=

I

1) +py- 1)

(31)

The variational inequality subproblem of Eq. (23) can be solved explicitly in
closed form in a similar manner.
Convergence is given in the following:
Theorem 3. The modified projection method described above converges to the solution
of the variational inequality of Eq. ( 13) under the assumptions that the utility functions
have bounded second-order derivatives and are concave.
Proof. It follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 that the function F(X) is both monotonic

and Lipschitz continuous, under the stated assumptions. Hence, as established in
Theorem 2 in Korpelevich (1976), the modified projection method is guaranteed to
converge under these conditions.
D
4. Numerical examples

Here, we present numerical examples that illustrate the model presented in
Section 2, along with the performance of the algorithm presented in Section 3. We
consider two examples, both of which are quadratic in form. The cost function used
in these examples is in terms of input prices, outputs, emissions and other
technological parameters. The algorithm was coded in FORTRAN 77. The system
used was the IBM SP2. The CPU times below are reported exclusive of input output and initialization times.
&ample l.

This example consists of five firms and 10 receptor points. Each firm produces
two outputs and emits two pollutants. Each firm in the permit market faces a joint
production and emission-abatement cost of the form

(32)
where w 1 and w2 represent the prices of the two inputs, and al if , a2;n bl;k, b2;k
and /; are the technological parameters. The values for these parameters are given
in Table 1.
The initial allocation of the licenses for pollutants t, t = l, 2, i.e. the lfJ terms
were set as follows: lfJ = 0, if i :5: j, for t = l, 2; otherwise, lfJ = St. The diffusion
matrix H terms, i.e. the h\1 terms were set as follows: hiJ = 0.0001 and hf1 =
0.00057 for pairs i, j.
In this example, we assume that the typical firm produces a higher quantity of
product 1 and emits a higher amount of pollutant 1. Hence, we initialized the
algorithm with q;� = 40 and q?2 = 20 for all firms i. Also, the prices charged for
these products are set at 1r 1 = 30 and 1r 2 = 20. Furthermore, because the two
pollutants emitted
would be dissimilar, the initial values for the emissions are set at
°
eJ" = 10 and e; = 5 for all the firms i. All the remaining initial variables are· set
equal to 1.
We set a = 0.01 and used e = 0.0001 for the convergence tolerance.
The algorithm converged in 99 iterations and 0.05 CPU seconds, and yielded the
equilibrium output vector for product 1 as

y,

q/ = (13.33,6.92, 14.16,10.77,6.33)

It gave the equilibrium output vector for product 2 as
qz* = (5.60,9.21,8.18,4.36, 7.16)

It gave the equilibrium emission vector for pollutant 1 as
e 1 * = (4.00,2.51,3.33,5.05,4.17)
Table 1
Example 1 - production and emission cost paramters
Firm i

WI

Wz

/;

al il

al;2

a2;1

a2;2

bl; 1

bl;2

b2; 1

b2 12

1
2
3
4
5

5
5
5
5
5

10
10
10
10
10

3.2
1.1
8.0
3.9
6.0

-2.0
-1.0
-2.0
-1.5
-2.5

-1.5
-2.0
-1.0
-3.0
-1.0

0.5
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.6

0.8
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.5

2.0
3.0
3.1
2.0
3.5

3.2
2.5
2.0
3.0
2.1

2.1
3.9
1.9
2.6
4.0

3.0
1.9
2.2
3.9
2.5

It gave the equilibrium emission vector for pollutant 2 as
e 2* = (1.84, 3.33, 1.43, 3.75, 2.00)
and it gave the license price vector for both pollutants t = 1, 2 as
p 1* = (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00) .

We also computed the maximum error for these terms, where the error is the
value of the corresponding function term in the variational inequality problem of
Eq. (19). Specifically, when qik is positive in the equilibrium condition of Eq. (14),
it follows that

should be equal to 1rk, i.e. the price for the product k. If this equality does not
hold, then qik is zero. Similarly, the equilibrium conditions of Eqs. (15)-(18) are
required to be satisfied. The maximum error for the expressions in the variables of
the variational inequality problem is 0.0001. We do not report all the license values
and abatement costs, because there are too many values.
Example 2
The second example also consists of five firms, 10 receptor points, two products
and two pollutants. However, in this example, we include an interaction term in the
joint production and emission abatement cost. Specifically, this cost function has
the form
Gi (ei , qi ) = (w 1 X w 2 )

11 2

[

'f, cl;,eI + 'f, c2 (e;/

t= I

+ r. dlik qik +
k=I

+ (w 1

X

w2 )

11 2

t

k=I
[

i1

t= I

2

d2 ik (qik > ]

'f, 'f, hl;,h2 k(eiq

t= I k= I

i

ik )]

(33)

where w 1 and w2 are the prices of the two inputs, and clit, c2it, dlik • d2;k , hliJ ,
h1;2 , h2u and h2; 2 are the technological parameters. The values for these parame
ters are given in Table 2.
The joint production and emission abatement cost is more general in this
example, because it includes an additional term that would handle the interaction
between the output produced and pollutants emitted.
To analyze a different scenario in this example, we consider firm i as initially
producing a greater quantity of product 2 and emitting a greater amount of

Table 2
Example 2 - production and emission cost parameters
Firm i
1
2
3
4
5

WI

Wz

cl;1

c1;2

c2 ;1

c2.,
'"

d1 il

dl;2

d2il

d 2;2

hln

hl ,_,

h2;1

h2'"
,

5

10
10
10
10
10

-1.0
-2.1
-2.0
-1.0
-2.4

-2.5
-1.6
-3.0
-2.0
-1.5

0.2
0.8
0.3
0.2
0.8

0.25
0.35
0.25
0.50
0.15

2.0
4.0
2.5
2.1
3.0

1.5
2.0
1.5
3.0

2.2
3.8
2.6
2.0
3.5

1.6
2.1
1.2
3.5
1.7

0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2

0.2
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.2

0.1
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.1

0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1

5

5
5
5

1.5

pollutant 2. Hence, the initial values for the two products are set as q/li = 20 and
q;i = 40. Also, the prices charged for the products are set at °1r1 = 25 and 1r2 = 40.
Furthermore, the emissions are initialized as ef" = 5 and e; = 10. The rest of the
data used are identical to these of Example 1.
The algorithm converged in 325 iterations and 0.17 seconds of CPU times, and
yielded the equilibrium output vector for product 1 as
qi*

= (5.21, 2.76,4.30, 5.70, 3.13)

It gave the equilibrium output vector for product 2 as
qz* = (11.96, 9.01, 15.98, 5.27, 11.29)

It gave the equilibrium emission vector for pollutant 1 as
e 1 * = (1.65, 1.09, 1.98, 1.68, 1.14)
It gave the equilibrium emission vector for pollutant 2 as
e 2* = (4.31, 1.61, 5.60, 1.67, 4.56)
and it gave the license price vector for both pollutants t = l, 2 as
p 1 * = (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00).

Again, we do not report the license values and abatement costs, because there
are too many of them. Moreover, each iteration is remarkably simply and computa
tionally very efficient, because closed-form expressions are used.
5. Conclusions

In this paper, we have utilized the theory of variational inequalities for the
formulation, analysis and computation of equilibrium solutions to a market model
in pollution permits that consists of multi-product, multi-pollutant firms. The
emissions are spatially differentiated.
In particular, we first derived the optimality conditions that govern each per
fectly competitive firm, and then obtained the economic conditions that govern the

licenses to pollute and the license prices. We also gave an economic interpretation
to these conditions. All the systems of equalities and inequalities were then shown
to satisfy a single inequality, i.e. a finite-dimensional variational inequality prob
lem.
We then turned to the qualitative analysis of the model and established certain
properties; in particular, the monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the function
that enters the variational inequality model, under reasonable conditions on the
cost functions that face each firm. The same conditions are needed to establish the
convergence of the proposed algorithm, i.e. the modified projection method. In the
context of our problem, this algorithm resolves what we expect to be a large-scale
problem into simple subproblems, each of which can be solved simultaneously and
in closed form.
We subsequently applied the algorithm to numerical examples to illustrate its
performance. Further research can entail incorporating other behaviors into the
model, such as oligopolistic behavior, sensitivity analysis, as well as evaluation of
alternative policy scenarios. Finally, to aid further in the operationalization of this
framework, the importance of empirical work cannot be underestimated.
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Appendix A

Al. Proof of Theorem 1
Assume that (q*, e*, I*, >..*, p*) E R mo + mr + 2mnr + "' is an equilibrium. Note that Eq.
(13) thus holds for all firms i = 1, ... , m, and that, summing it over all firms, one obtains

m

r

/..,,,

/..,,,

+" " [
i= 1 r= 1

aG(e*

*)

; ; ,q; +
ae;

t

II

]

"Jt..1lj.*h1lj- (e'l - e'*)
I
i= 1
�

m

r

11

E E E (pJ*- A'.j) (t!j- l!j)

+

i= I j=It= I

+

m

n

r

E E E (t!j- h'.je!*)( AL + A'.j) � 0,

i = I j = It = I

V(q, e, l, ).)

E R'':o+mr+ 2m11r.

(Al)

Also, from the system of Eq. (18), we can conclude that the equilibrium must satisfy
11

r

m

E E E (t!Y- t!j)(pJ- pJ *) � o,
j= It= Ii I

Vp ER!'.

(A2)

=

Indeed, note that, if pJ* > 0, then Eq. (18) gives that
m

� (1lj
L.J

10

-

i= I

lI)'*) = 0

and Eq. (A2) must hold. However, if pJ* = 0, then Eq. (18) gives that
m

� (tI}'0
i..,

-

i= I

l'*
>0
I} ) -

and Eq. (A2) must hold.
Finally, summing Eqs. (Al) and (A2), one obtains the variational inequality of Eq. (19).
We now establish the converse of the proof, i.e. that the solution to Eq. (19) also satisfies
Eqs. (13) and (18). Let (q*,e*,l*, ).*, p*) E R + mr + lmnr + '" be a solution of Eq. (19). If
one lets qfk = qfl for all i, k; e/ = e/* for all i; l/j = l/ j for all i, j, t; A}i = A}j, for all i, j,
t; and substitutes these values into Eq. (19), one obtains
mo

n

r

m

E E E (1;y-1;;)(PJ - pJ*) � o,
j= It= Ii= I

Vp ER!'

(A3)

which implies the system conditions of Eq. (18).
Similarly, if one lets pJ = pJ* for j, t, and substitutes these values into Eq. (19), then one
obtains
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r

�
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£.J
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*
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'''
'
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m
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I
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I
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E E E (pJ*- A'.j)(t/ - t;j)

i= I j= It= I

m

II

j

r

L L L (tlj - h\/!*){ A'.j - A'.j) � 0,
i= I j= It= I

'fl(q,e,l, ).) E R":.o+mr+2m11r

(A4)

which implies that Eq. (13) must hold for the firms.

D

A2. Proof of Lemma 1
We will establish that F(X) is monotone, i.e.
[F(X 1 ) - F(X 2 )] (X 1

2
- X ):.::;

0,

'v'X 1 ,X 2 EK

(A5)

In view of the definition of F(X) in the above model, Eq. (25) takes the form

2
2
+ ;
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I) ]) (e'I
l
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j= I
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+
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i= I j= It= I
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+
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i= I j= It= 1
11

r

1
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m
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j= It= Ii= I

1

2
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(A6)

After combining and simplifying terms, Eq. (A6) reduces to
;., �

aG;(e/, q/)

i=, k=,

aq;k

----1.., 1.., [

-

aG;(el, q?)]

;., � iJG;(e/, q;')
+ 1.., 1.., [
t
iJe;
i= I r= I
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_

1

2

(qik - qik)

iJG;( e;2, q?)
iJe;1

] (e;11

_

,2

C;

).

(A7)

However, under the assumption that the utility functions are concave, we know that
minus the gradient of the utility function is monotone; hence, the expression in Eq. (A7)
must be greater than or equal to zero.
o
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